It’s often said that “you can’t kill an idea.” Those who cite the saying usually do so to suggest that an ideology cannot be defeated through the use of force. Therefore, if the ideology has sufficiently broad support, it is necessary to embrace it, at least to a significant extent.
This truth was recently invoked regarding Israel’s war against Hamas. For example, the European Union’s top diplomat Joseph Borrell warns that “Hamas is an idea and you don’t kill an idea.” John Sawers, former head of the British intelligence agency MI6, similarly states that “you can kill individuals, you can’t kill an idea.” I have occasionally seen this trope invoked with respect to Russia. Even if Putin suffers defeat in Ukraine, it is said, we cannot kill the idea of Russian imperialist nationalism.
Such claims are false, or at least greatly exaggerated. Coercion can, and often does, kill ideas! But before I go any further, I would like to point out that I do not mean to suggest that all ideological conflicts can and should be resolved by force. In liberal democracies, the best response to evil ideologies is usually a combination of constitutional constraints on government power and persuasion.
Even when large-scale force is effective and necessary (as unfortunately often happens when dealing with terrorists and authoritarian regimes), it might be better combined with other means of persuasion: sticks supplemented by carrots. Finally, nothing in my argument suggests that “anything goes,” even in conflict with the most repugnant of ideologies. Minimizing harm to innocent civilians is a moral imperative, even in cases where it may not be strategically necessary.
Taken literally, the statement that you can’t kill an idea is undeniably true. Ideas have no physical existence and therefore cannot be destroyed by physical force. But force can, and often does, play a decisive role in ensuring that an idea is not implemented. And this has important implications for how we should manage various conflicts, including those facing Ukraine and Israel. Overwhelming force can be a crucial tool.
Obviously, the implementation of an ideology can often be prevented by killing its adherents. Dead fascists, communists or radical Islamists can’t do much to implement their ideas. Perhaps their deaths will inspire others to take their place. But this is far from a given, especially, as we will see, if the cause they support suffers a shocking defeat. Additionally, new hires may not have the experience and skills of their predecessors. If, for example, Israel wipes out Hamas’s best fighters or Ukraine decimates the most effective Russian front-line units, their replacements are likely to be less powerful. And the fear of being killed or injured like their predecessors can dissuade many potential recruits from enlisting.
In addition to personnel, effective implementation of an ideology usually requires institutions. The use of force can destroy those institutions. When the Nazi state was destroyed by the Allies, this made it extremely difficult for the surviving Nazis to continue implementing their ideas. The same goes for the destruction of the nascent Confederate state by the Union, the destruction of the ISIS regime by a US-led coalition, and many other cases. Ideologies whose very implementation requires large-scale coercion – including fascism, communism and the radical Islamism of Hamas – are particularly in need of institutional support. They are therefore especially likely to be hampered by the destruction of their institutions.
Sometimes institutions can be rebuilt. But doing so is a difficult task. And reconstruction itself can be blocked by the use of force, or the threat of it.
So far I have outlined the ways in which the use of force can kill ideas by blocking their implementation even without changing anyone’s mind. The dead cannot continue to fight for their cause, even if they remain true believers to the end. And even living true believers often have little capacity to do so if they lack the necessary institutions.
But history shows that a catastrophic defeat can also significantly reduce the attractiveness of an ideology. On the contrary, victory can strengthen it. I outlined some of the reasons why in a previous post on the Russia-Ukraine war:
Historically, victory in war has often strengthened support for the victors’ ideology. The triumph of the American Revolution increased support for Enlightenment liberalism on both sides of the Atlantic, while promoting causes such as democratization and the abolition of slavery. The Bolshevik Revolution and subsequent Communist victories in the Russian Civil War and World War II greatly increased worldwide support for Marxism. Likewise, the early successes of Mussolini and Hitler won new adherents to fascism.
In contrast, the crushing defeat of the Axis in World War II led to the collapse of support for fascist ideology, including in Germany and Italy. The defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War (admittedly only partly military) and the subsequent collapse significantly weakened the attractiveness of communism….
Throughout human history, ideologies have risen and fallen partly based on success and failure in military and geopolitical conflicts.
Much of this reflects irrational factors in the formation of public opinion. Victory in war doesn’t actually tell us much about the merits of the victor’s ideology. It might not be right…
But in a world where public opinion is heavily influenced by ignorance and prejudice, people routinely use informational shortcuts to make political judgments. One of these shortcuts is the presumption that it is good to be on the winning side. If supporters of an ideology prevail in a high-profile war, there must be something in their ideas! Such prejudices may be reinforced by the fallacious but widespread assumption that it is necessarily good to be “on the right side of history” and that “the arc of the moral universe bends toward justice.” If so, one way to figure out which side has a just cause is to see who wins!
Another notable example from American history is the defeat of the Confederacy. The ideas of slavery and secession were crushed more by coercion than persuasion. Before and during the war, Confederates openly and proudly declared their commitment to these ideals. The crushing defeat led most to accept that secession was impossible, and many to pretend that they had not fought for slavery at all, but rather for “states’ rights.”
Defeat is especially likely to dry up support for ideologies that rely heavily on projecting an image of strength and power. This applies to many forms of nationalism, including that of Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Projecting strength is a major theme of Putin’s propaganda, which also includes such things as portraying Putin himself as a virile hunter and macho athlete. If a regime that prides itself on its strength suffers a crushing defeat and is therefore weak, this is likely to reduce support for its ideology. Ask the Nazis and Italian and Japanese fascists!
Furthermore, the crushing defeat undermines the hope that the cause will ultimately triumph. In principle, adherents can maintain their commitment to their cause, even if they believe it has little or no chance of success. But struggling without hope is painful and depressing. So, many erstwhile believers – especially less committed ones – will instead turn their backs on the ideology and even try to persuade themselves and others that they never really supported it in the first place. Consider the way many Germans, after World War II, claimed that they had never supported Hitler (even though too many had actually supported him).
Such dynamics may not influence the most fanatical supporters of an ideology. But the most die-hard fanatics cannot win without the help of a much larger group of less committed supporters. No ideological movement has ever prevailed without the support of a large number of the latter.
In summary, the use of force – especially in the form of inflicting crushing defeats – can, and often does, kill ideas. As we consider how to counter the enemies of Western liberal democracy, we would do well to keep in mind the persuasive power of victory.
This does not mean that we should rely on strength alone. Instead, it often helps to associate strength with positive ideological appeals, promising a better life to those who reject our adversaries’ ideology. For this reason, among others, I have supported opening Western doors to Palestinian refugees, both Russian and Gazan, fleeing their respective horrific regimes and the wars they have started.
We should also incentivize Russian troops to surrender, turn to Russian opposition leaders like Vladimir Kara-Murza and Ilya Yashin, and point out that a future, more liberal Russia will receive good treatment, like that accorded Germany, Italy, and Japan after World War II. Second War. For their part, Israeli leaders would do well to consider how to more effectively attract and reward Palestinians willing to reject Hamas’ ideology.
Ideally, we should use the big stick of force to crush and demoralize supporters of the enemy’s ideology, while offering carrots to those who repudiate it, or sometimes (as in the case of Russian military defectors) even simply refuse to support the enemy . regime. In any case, finding the optimal balance between the two can be difficult. I certainly don’t pretend that this post is anything like a definitive guide on how to do this. But I hope it can achieve the much more modest goal of explaining how and why the use of force often plays a key role in killing ideas.